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inventions. We find that, before the Act, academic institutions had a strong
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After the introduction of the Act, French academic institutions increased their
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1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, various policy initiatives have been undertaken in most
European countries with the aim of strengthening the links between acad-
emia and industry, and to increase technology transfer efforts by academic
institutions and faculty members. Many such initiatives have touched upon
intellectual property right (IPR) legislation and its relationship to univer-
sity policy, with the introduction of incentive schemes to induce academic
scientists to commercialize more actively their research results, most often
through patenting and licensing. All of these reforms share the assumption that
European universities and scientists do not undertake enough IPR-mediated
technology transfer, especially when compared to their US counterparts
(Mowery and Sampat 2005).
Recent studies, however, have shown that such assumption may derive
from lack of attention to the legal and institutional differences between the
university systems of the two continents. In particular, too much faith has been
placed in available statistics on the number of patents owned by universities
(university-owned patents) as opposed to patents covering inventions by
academic scientists, but assigned to the individual scientists, public research
organizations and, above all, business companies (university-invented patents;
surveys by Geuna and Nesta 2006; and Verspagen 2006). Lissoni et al. (2008)
suggest that university-owned patents in France, Italy and Sweden are no
more than 11% of all academic patents (whether university-owned or merely
university-invented), as opposed to 60–80% academic patents owned by busi-
ness companies. This implies that European universities may contribute to
technology transfer activity by producing inventions, whose IPRs they choose
(for institutional, strategic or managerial reasons) to leave entirely in their
public or private partners’ hands.
When it comes to measuring the effect of patent-inducing policies, there-
fore, we may be interested not only to measuring whether they have indeed
produced an increase in patenting by universities, but also whether such
increase may derive from a patent property shift (from public partners and
business companies to universities) and not only from an increase in the num-
ber of patented inventions. More generally, the number of European academic
patents in the hands of business companies is so high that they have necessarily
to be taken into account in any evaluation effort.
In this paper we build upon Lissoni et al. (2008) in order to assess the
impact on patent ownership patterns of IPR-related reforms. In particular, we
explore the consequences of the French government’s introduction, in 1999, of
the Innovation Act, which promoted, among other things, a more aggressive
patenting activity by universities. In particular, we test whether the Act (also
known as “Loi Allegre”) has significantly increased the likelihood of a French
academic patent being assigned to a university rather than to a business
company or a public research organization. We also assess, in the same respect,
the effect of the creation of a technology transfer office within the academic
inventor’s university.
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The study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a brief review
of the IPR-related aspects of science policy reforms introduced in France
over the past 10 years, with special emphasis on the Innovation Act. We also
provide some comparative information on similar policies introduced in the
US and in Europe. In Sections 3 and 4, respectively, we present the data and
the econometric model used to examine the effect of the new law. Section 5
illustrates and discusses our results, and Section 6 concludes and outlines the
directions of our future research.
2 IPR-related reforms of university policy
2.1 The international experience
Policy-makers’ attention to IP aspects of academic research is mainly due
to the visibility of the US experience, where universities’ contributions to
inventing and patenting have increased substantially over the last quarter of
a century, following legislative changes introduced in 1980.1
Among such changes, the introduction of Public Law 96-517, better known
as the Bayh-Dole Act, stands out. This Act, among other things, allowed US
universities to retain IPRs over the inventions resulting from federally-funded
research and established the government’s march-in right, that is, the right to
arrange for licensing of patents left unexploited by academic administrations.
The Act was meant to provide a unique set of rules for universities which,
until then, had had to cope with several funding agencies (such as the National
Institutes of Health, the Department of Defence, or the National Science
Foundation), each of them with a different IPR policy (Mowery et al. 2001).
It was also meant to provide universities with both stick and carrot incentives
to commercialize their inventions.2 More generally, the Bayh-Dole Act com-
plemented another set of policies, all aimed at reinforcing the US IP regime,
based upon a more severe enforcement of rules against patent infringements
and the extension of patentable matters to living organisms and software, two
fields where the academic contribution to invention is more than noticeable
(Kortum and Lerner 1999; Jaffe 2000).
After the introduction of the Act, the number of patents issued to universi-
ties increased from 264 in 1979 to 2,436 in 1997 (NSF 2006), so that university-
owned patents now represent 5% of the total number of patents issued to US
assignees. In addition, the number of universities with a technology transfer
office has grown from 150 in 1991 to 400 in 1997 (AUTM 2004).
1See Henderson et al. (1998), Jensen and Thursby (2001), and Mowery et al. (2004). See also
Section 2.1 in this paper.
2As a matter of fact, the stick, that is, the march-in right, has hardly, if ever, been used (Rai and
Eisenberg 2003).
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In Europe, the British government was the first one to emulate the US
initiatives, with the introduction, in 1985, of the right of universities to patent in
their own name and commercialize the results of their own faculty’s research.
Previously, the British Technology Group, a public agency, had the nominal
exclusivity on inventions by academics (Clarke 1985).
Shortly afterwards, at a time of constant or decreasing levels of public
financing of universities in Continental Europe, academic institutions were
encouraged to look at markets for technologies as a source of complementary
funding (Geuna 2001).3 Such strategic reorientation has often gone along
with the introduction of IP law reforms aimed at increasing universities’ and
academics’ incentives to patenting. Between 2000 and 2002, for example,
Germany, Austria, and Denmark all abolished the professor’s privilege, a
typical institution of German and Scandinavian law, with the explicit aim of
increasing the number of university patents (while, on the other hand, Italy
introduced it in 2001, and with the same objective).4 In the same spirit, many
countries have introduced incentive schemes and training programs for IPR
awareness and management, as described by Lissoni and Franzoni (2009).
2.2 The French experience
In France, no specific reform of the IP regime over academic inventions has
ever taken place. Rather, issues related to IPR management by universi-
ties have been dealt within broader reforms of the national science system.
These have touched upon the relationship between academic institutions and
large public research organizations (PROs). Therefore, before examining the
specific IP-related reforms in which we are interested, it is necessary to discuss
the role of universities in the French national system of innovation, and how it
has changed over recent times.
2.2.1 The French universities’ position in the national system of innovation
Differently from their US counterparts (but also from many European ones,
such as the British or the Dutch), French universities have always struggled
3In Europe, the system of government structural funds has been partially replaced by a more
competitive manner of financing the public research system: indeed, since the late 1980s, the
subvention of universities has relied more and more on problem-oriented and industry-oriented
public programs rather than on public budgetary channels. This switch in sources of funds could
be considered a result of the shrinking of public research budgets and change in the rationale for
science support occurring in Europe.
4The professor’s privilege exempts university professors from standard provisions concerning
business employees’ inventions. National legislations worldwide usually state that IPRs over
employees’ inventions belong to the employer, as long as the employees’ job description includes
innovation activities, as with R&D workers and scientists in general. Countries that admit the
professor’s privilege allow an exception for university professors, who can retain all IPRs over
their inventions, and have no or limited disclosure duties towards their employers (that is, their
universities). For a discussion, see Lissoni et al. (2009).
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to establish themselves as central actors in the public research system, let
alone to gain the necessary autonomy for the purpose. This difficulty has deep
historical roots (Neave 1993). After all existing universities had been abolished
under the Revolutionary regime at the end of the eighteenth century, a new
university (one for the entire country) was established by Napoleon in 1808.
Under the name of Imperial University (or University of France), the latter
had exclusively teaching tasks for the education of medical doctors, teachers
and lawyers, while the Grandes Ecoles, a peculiar French institution, were
charged with the formation of the technical and administrative elites.5 It
was only in 1896 that the Imperial University was disbanded and regional
faculties gained the status of universities, but still with no autonomy from the
central government. Their research activities were conducted in small personal
laboratories by a professor with a few assistants and most often needed funding
from external partners (as with Pasteur’s laboratory in Lille in 1854). French
universities had to wait until the 1970s to gain some rights to self-organize their
teaching and research activities, but even then they got no freedom in terms of
finance and real estate management, let alone the handling of IPR matters.
The latter, therefore, were quite neglected or left in the hands of PROs.
PROs, in fact, have for long been the dominant force of the French public
research system since World War II, but also one which more recent policies
have tried to integrate within academic institutions, in particular, universities.
The Centre National de la Recherche Scientif ique (CNRS) was originally
established in 1939 with the express goal of supporting academic research
and/or performing research through its own labs. Over the years, a similar role
came to be played by INSERM (the National Institute of Health and Medical
Research) in the medical sciences, and by other, smaller PROs. During the
1960s, both demographic factors and a political climate in favour of more for
democratization of education led to massive university enrolment, which in
turn called for the isolation of larger and better endowed laboratories from
teaching. As a result, successive governments pushed the CNRS to establish
a system of partnerships with universities and their staff, on the basis of a
periodic evaluation by CNRS committees. This kind of mechanism, which
has been extended over time, led, on the one hand, to splitting the academic
environment between teaching and research departments, and, on the other
hand, to integrating a substantial part of PRO personnel into university re-
search groups. Larger and better connected departments now receive financial
and material assistance from CNRS, which results in a vertical hierarchy of
university labs: those staffed only by CNRS personnel and funded directly by
CNRS; those staffed by both CNRS and university personnel; and finally those
5The Grandes Ecoles still play the same highly selective role. They are commonly divided into
Ecoles d’ingénieurs (Schools of Engineering,), Ecoles de Commerce (Business Schools, or ESC)
and Ecoles Normales Supérieurs (ENS, which offer degrees in hard sciences, social sciences, and
humanities).
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exclusively staffed by university personnel, with little or no access to CNRS
funds (Larédo and Mustar 2001). A similar arrangement has been enacted for
INSERM.
In the last decade, the whole system has witnessed several changes: the
members of academic staff in universities have increased to more than 50,000
units, whereas the totality of PROs now employs less than 35,000 scientists.
For a comparison, consider the 1970s, when the CNRS alone had as many
researchers as the entire university system. Moreover, a second trait of the
academic system, the Grandes Ecoles’ separation from research, seems to
have decreased. Finally, successive reforms have created a complex system
of universities with different educational and research aims. According to the
DEP/MENESR6 classification, we can distinguish between Grands Etablisse-
ments, Schools of Engineering, Instituts Nationaux Polytechniques, Universities
with a Medical School, Universities without a Medical School, and Scientif ic
Universities. This distinction is loosely based on two criteria: the statutory
norms according to which they operate, and their disciplinary orientation.
Statutory norms set both the Grands Etablissements and the Schools of
Engineering apart, due to the reduced number of students they admit; while
the latter are devoted to Engineering disciplines, the former are, from the
disciplinary viewpoint, a heterogenous set. The Instituts Nationaux Polytech-
niques (3 in total) are also specialized in engineering education and corre-
spond to a localized grouping of engineering schools (Grenoble, Toulouse,
Nancy).
As for disciplinary orientation, Universities are fully interdisciplinary (with
the possible exception of medicine), while Scientific Universities are special-
ized in the hard sciences. In this classification scheme, the Grandes Ecoles
mentioned above fall into either the School of Engineering category or the
Grands Etablissements category, according to their specialization.
2.2.2 Technology transfer and the Innovation Act of 1999
The French public research system has often been criticized for being unable
to transfer the results of its world-renowned research to industry. University-
industry technology transfer was long characterized by strong intervention of
the central government, whose large programs aimed chiefly at promoting
the national independence of strategic sectors such as electronics, defense
and nuclear technologies. These programs were put into practice by CNRS
6DEP/MENESR (Direction de l’Evaluation et de la Prospective / Ministere d’Education Na-
tionale, de l’Enseignement Superieur et de la Recherche) is the official statistical Bureau of the
Ministry of Education and Research. The classification we use here was last updated in 2003
and, although it serves mainly statistical purposes, it reflects the legal classification produced
by the higher education reforms introduced in 1968, when the old faculties and institutes were
reorganized into modern departments (Le Feuvre and Metso 2005; Bach and Llerena 2010).
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and INSERM and other large PROs, as well as by ad hoc agencies (such
as CEA for atomic energy, INRA for agricultural research, and CNES for
telecommunications), under direct control of the government.
The French government’s attention towards the innovation role of the
public research system increased significantly in the 1970s and bore its early
fruits at the beginning of the 1980s, when the Mitterand presidency pushed
through the Research Act (Loi d’Orientation et de Programmation), which
listed among the explicit science policy objectives the commercial valorization
and diffusion of public laboratories’ research results (art. 14, Public Law
82–610; see: Loi 1982). The same indications were extended to universities
two years later (Public Law 84–52; see: Loi 1984). These actions led to the
creation of a dedicated agency for the transfer of research results from PROs
– ANVAR – and the proliferation of regional centers of innovation – CRITTs
– responsible for easing access to the pool of local competences developed
in universities. None of these interventions, however, achieved satisfactory
results, at least according to the policy-makers’ viewpoint (Larédo and Mustar
2001). As for intellectual property, this did not figure prominently in the
government’s agenda for university-industry technology transfer. Neither IPR
legislation nor any law on universities and PROs specifically addressed the
issue of patents over public-funded research results. The new Code de la
propriété intellectuelle of 1992 never mentioned explicitly the case of academic
scientists, whose economic rights over inventions were implicitly disciplined
by the same rules applicable to R&D employees; universities and PROs (as
employers) formally retained full control over inventions resulting from their
scientists’ research, to the extent that the latter was conducted as part of the
scientists’ contractual duties as employees. As a matter of fact, large PROs
dealt actively with their scientists’ inventive activity, either through internal
Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) or subsidiary companies in charge of
patent management; universities did not have this type of organizations, and
left IPR matters in their professors’ hands (Gallochat 2003; see also Carayol
2006).
In the mid-1990s, the government was still deeply concerned with coopera-
tion and knowledge transfer between the public research system and industry
(Vavakova 2006). Several consultations and proposals (Fillon in 1994 and
d’Aubert in 1997) led to the approval of Public Law 99-597, also known as the
Innovation Act or “Loi Allegre”, from the name of the Minister of Research
at the time (see: Loi 1999). This piece of legislation was profoundly influenced
by an earlier ministerial report (the Guillaume report in 1998), which stressed
that a number of barriers hampered the flow of knowledge between public
research and industry, among them a far too limited use of IPR instruments by
universities.
The Innovation Act was not a piece of IPR legislation comparable to the
Bayh-Dole Act, as it left the Code de la propriété intellectuelle unchanged, and
at the same time introduced a number of provisions that went well beyond
intellectual property. However, it aimed, among other things, to increase
both the IPR awareness within the public research system and the rate
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of commercialization of academic inventions. A number of provisions were
included in order to encourage universities and PROs to retain the IPRs over
their scientists’ inventions, or at least to share them with industrial partners
(Gallochat 2003).
First, the Innovation Act added explicitly the commercial exploitation of
patents and licences to the universities’ mission, on the same footing as
teaching and research (art. 1, IV, comma for PROs and art. 2, IV, comma for
universities, in: Loi 1999).
Second, it introduced the possibility for both universities and PROs
to create internal TTOs (called SAICs: Services d’Activités Industrielles et
Commerciales), to staff them with external personnel, and to run them ac-
cording to business-like budgetary and accounting rules. (art. 2, I, comma for
universities, in: Loi 1999).7
In order to encourage PROs and universities, which had already set up
TTO-like subsidiaries, to switch to SAICs, and to retain control of intellectual
property, a favorable taxation rule was introduced. According to this, sub-
sidiaries’ industrial and commercial activities were subject to taxation, whereas
those of SAICs were not, as long as intellectual property was owned or co-
owned by the PRO or university.8
Immediately after approval of the Innovation Act, the Ministry of Research
diffused a set of guidelines for university-industry cooperation, which in-
cluded the recommendation to adopt an intellectual property charter (so that,
especially in universities, IPR matters could be explicitly regulated) as well as
negotiation with companies of “joint ownership agreements” over the results
of collaborative R&D. According to the Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
such agreements are necessary in order to allow for flexibility in managing
co-owned patents.9
2.2.3 How to evaluate the impact of the Innovation Act
on academic patenting in France?
In order to assess the impact of the Innovation Act on academic patenting in
France, we need to consider that history, both remote and recent, still weighs
7Before the Innovation Act, internal TTOs had to be run according to the same public law
rules that disciplined the entire activity of universities and PROs. Such rules limited flexibility
in recruitment (staff of TTOs had to come from within the organization, and be paid according
to wage grids fixed by the government, and mainly related to seniority) and budgeting/accounting
(which were intended to allow for governmental control of expenses, rather than business-like
management of research and licensing contracts).
8This implies that R&D contracts that left all IPRs in the industrial partners’ hands were subject
to taxation, while those that provided for universities’ co-ownership or full ownership were not.
These changes were scheduled to take place starting 1 January 2003.
9In principle, co-owned patents can be managed only through co-owners’ unanimous decisions.
This would make it difficult to license or sell them. Joint ownership agreements allow one partner
to waive some decision rights to the others, so that managerial decisions can be taken more
swiftly.
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on French universities. It is clear that the Innovation Act is just one of many
steps taken in France over the years in order to promote more autonomy for
universities, and less dependence on CNRS and INSERM.
Therefore we expect to observe that its introduction helped universities
to retain the property of a higher share of academic patents by withdrawing
them from the exclusive control of the largest PROs. We also expect that
French universities started engaging in tighter negotiation over IPRs with their
business partners. Although the Innovation Act did not introduce financial
autonomy for universities, but rather room and tools for limited self-financing
via the market for technologies, it legitimized the use and exploitation of IPRs.
More generally, handling complex IPR contracts, managing the related costs
and income and setting personal incentives for academic inventors, are still
tasks well beyond the possibilities of many French academic institutions.
Our two hypotheses to be tested, therefore, are the following:
1. The Innovation Act, by strengthening academic institutions with regards
to IPRs, has increased the share of academic patents owned or co-owned
by such institutions;
2. For the same reasons, the Innovation Act has reduced both the share of
academic patents owned exclusively by PROs and the share controlled
exclusively by business companies.
In addition, we stress that the Innovation Act followed a decade of earlier
reforms, many of which had already encouraged the most research-intensive
universities to set up their own TTOs, although possibly in the form of
subsidiaries rather than SAICs. Thus, the impact of the Innovation Act can be
appreciated only by controlling for the creation date of such offices, the impact
of which may have been quite significant with respect to individual universities’
IPR policy.
Finally, it is important to stress that data constraints do not allow us to test
whether the Innovation Act increased the number of academic patents overall,
whether retained by universities or assigned to PROs or business companies.
The nature of such constraints, and the reason why they are so binding, will be
made clear in the next section.
3 Data
Data for this study come from the KEINS database, which provides informa-
tion on academic patenting in several European countries, and is part of the
larger EP-INV database.10
10Lissoni et al. (2006) describe in detail the methodology for the classification of patents by
inventor in the EP-INV database as well as the methodology applied to build the KEINS database
on academic inventors.
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Table 1 French academic
patenting activity between
1994 and 2002
Patents Inventors Patent
productivity
Total inventors 53,285 51,839 1.028
Academic inventors 1,744 1,208 1.444
Share of academia 3.27% 2.33%
The French section of the KEINS database contains detailed information
on faculty members who appear as inventors of one or more patents applied
for at the EPO (European Patent Office) between 1994 and 2002. It is the
result of a matching exercise of names and surnames of scientists and engineers
active within academic institutions, with names and surnames of inventors, as
reported on EPO patents.
Data on French academic scientists and engineers originate from the
Ministry of Education and were provided by BETA (Bureau d’Economie
Théorique et Appliquée), a joint research unit of the University of Strasbourg
and CNRS. They refer exclusively to tenured staff on active duty in 2005,
to whom we will often refer, for the sake of simplicity, as “professors”. In
particular, the database contains information on 32,006 professors in natural,
medical, and engineering sciences, and includes variables such as their date of
birth, university affiliation, and discipline, as well as their date of nomination
to the current academic rank (either “maître de conférences” or “professeur”).
After matching inventors from the EP-INV database with professors in the
ministerial records, we filtered out incongruous matches by employing age and
discipline filters. The age filter excluded all matches in which the professor
turned out to be younger than 21 at the time of the patent filing. The discipline
filter was based on a list of “incompatible” academic disciplines and IPC
3-digit codes of the patent.11 We then moved on to check for homonymy cases,
in which two matched individuals share the same name and surname, but are
not the same person. Given the large numbers of matches to check, we chose
to focus only on those pairs wherein the inventor’s latest patent had been
filed after 1993, based on the assumption that additional information on the
related individuals would be easier to retrieve. This choice left us with 3,951
inventor-professor matches. For 2,400 of them, we collected information either
through direct contact (after retrieving the professor’s e-mail address from the
web) or by examining all online-available information (the professor’s CV,
publications or mentioning in the patent applicant’s website).12 For another
484 matches, the required information was provided by academic co-inventors
11IPC stands for International Patent Classification. It is a 12-digit contents-based classification
system produced by WIPO (the World Intellectual Property Organization) and adopted by the
EPO as the key tool for classifying patents according to the technological field they address.
12Additional information on the universities employing our academic inventors was collected from
the database of CURIE, the French network of technology transfer offices.
Institutional change and academic patenting: French universities
Table 2 Distribution of French patents and academic patents, by technology classa
Technology class All patents, Academic All Acad. B/A D/C
no. and patents, no. inventors, inventors,
% (A) and % (B) no. (C) no. (D)
Electronics 12,991 (24.38%) 251 (14.39%) 14,448 218 1.93% 1.51%
Instruments 6,823 (12.80%) 350 (20.07%) 9,189 341 5.13% 3.71%
Chemistry 6,729 (12.63%) 436 (25.00%) 8,951 343 6.48% 3.83%
Pharmaceuticals 5,363 (10.06%) 497 (28.50%) 6,352 399 9.27% 6.28%
Process engineering 6,784 (12.73%) 138 (7.91%) 7,941 145 2.03% 1.83%
Machinery - transport 9,431 (17.70%) 58 (3.33%) 10,456 44 0.61% 0.42%
Others 5,164 (9.69%) 14 (0.80%) 4,889 11 0.27% 0.22%
Total 53,285 (100%) 1,744 (100%) 62,226 1,501b 3.27% 2.33%
aPatents are classified according to the DT7/OST reclassification of IPC (OST 2004)
bThe sum of all academic inventors exceeds their actual number, as given in Table 1, because some
inventors patent in more than one technology class
(as when professor A, co-inventor with professor B of a given patent, provided
information on the latter, who had turned out to be unreachable). For the
remaining 1,067 matches, corresponding to 587 professors and 1,215 patents,
either no information was available, or the professors never answered our
e-mails or telephone calls, so we excluded them from the analysis.13
As shown in Table 1, we ascertained that more than 1,700 patent applica-
tions filed at the EPO between 1994 and 2002 relate to inventions and co-
inventions by 1,208 French faculty active in 2005. They represent 3.27% of all
French patents. As discussed in Lissoni et al. (2008), these values place France
very much in line with other European countries (such as Italy and Sweden),
and possibly not very far behind the USA.
Most of the academic patents are in the fields of Instruments, Chemistry and
Pharmaceuticals, respectively 20.07%, 25% and 28.5% (see Table 2). Their
inventors come mainly from academic disciplines related to the life sciences
13Dropping patents by non-respondents minimizes Type I errors (where the hypothesis is that an
inventor-professor match signals an academic patent), but introduces Type II errors which lead
to underestimation of the number of academic patents in any given year. This is one more reason
not to rely on our data for a precise estimation of university scientists’ contribution to patenting
in France, as explained at the end of Section 2. As for possible biases with respect to the main
research question of the paper (whether the Innovation Act increased universities’ propensity to
retain the intellectual property of their scientists’ invention), we observe that:
– the distribution of non-respondents’ patents per year is very similar to that of respondents’
patents (Pearson correlation index is over 92%);
– the distributions per technological classes and type of ownership are also very similar.
Thus, we do not expect that including non-respondents’ patents in the analysis would have
improved our results, indeed quite the opposite. Finally, we suspect that many non-respondents
who were not academic inventors simply did not bother to let us know, so that many non-responses
are equivalent to negative responses.
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Table 3 Distribution of academic patents by aggregated disciplines
Aggregated disciplines Patents Inventors Professors
Mathematics 72 35 6,270
Physics 125 67 2,660
Chemistry 545 321 3,829
Earth science 2 1 1,090
Biology 356 228 5,445
Life science 397 246 6,181
Engineering 32 31 2,052
Electronics 383 279 4,324
All disciplines 1,912 1,208 31,851
The sum of all patents by discipline patents is higher than the actual number of patents, due to the
fact that inventors from different disciplines appear as co-inventors of the same patents
and electronics (Table 3), and represent 2.33% of all French inventors. These
findings are in line with those by Lissoni et al. (2008) for Italy and Sweden
and Lissoni et al. (2009) for Denmark, and comparable to what was found by
Thursby et al. (2009) for the USA.14
When it comes to examining time trends, we can only start our observa-
tions from 1994. In fact, our counting of academic patents relies on archival
information on academic scientists active in 2004-05, which means that we do
not have information on the identity of retired scientists. As a consequence,
the older the patents we examine, the less likely we are to identify correctly
those invented by such scientists. Therefore, we are bound to underestimate
the number of academic patents produced back in time.
Our data also suffer from right censoring, as the available patent data at
the time of our collection stopped in 2001/02 (indeed, not even all patent
applications with priority date in these two years – which we consider jointly -
had been published). Although caution in drawing conclusions is to be recom-
mended, Fig. 1 shows that some positive trends may be detected in the number
of academic patents after 1994 (the first year for which our data can be trusted
for measuring the extent of the phenomenon), especially in Pharmaceuticals,
Chemistry, and Electronics. The 2001/02 dip may be entirely due to a statistical
artefact, for the reasons explained above.
However, this trend does not translate into an increasing weight of academic
patenting over total patenting by domestic inventors, as shown in Fig. 2. This
suggests a lack of impact of the Innovation Act on academic patenting, but our
data cannot substantiate this evidence, nor can they be explained by it, due to
14Patents by non-respondent professors, which we excluded from the analysis, exhibit a dis-
tribution by technology class which is more similar to that of non-academic patents than to
academic ones. This suggests that non-respondents’ patents are more likely not to be academic
ones.
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Fig. 1 Number of academic
patents by technological class,
1994–2001/02
the short time window they cover. So, as already stated in Section 2, we prefer
to leave this issue for future research.15
We classify assignees of academic patents into three categories:
– Companies (C), which include both business companies (French and
foreign) and individual inventors;16
– Public research organizations (PRO), which include all institutions known
in France as Etablissements Public à Caractère Scientif ique et Technique
(EPST; such as CNRS or INSERM) or Etablissements Public à Caractère
Industriel et Commercial (EPIC), and are listed as such on the website of
the French Ministry of Research;
– Universities (UNI), as listed in the same database from which we extracted
the professors’ names and information. They can be divided according to
the DEP/MENSER classification we introduced in Section 2.2.1.
15While right censoring may be less of a problem when investigating patent ownership trends
(which depend mainly on shorter-term decisions by university administrators and negotiation with
industrial partners or PROs), it is certainly a problem when examining patent numbers. In this
case, in fact, the latter turn out to be an indicator of research output, which is affected by research
inputs and change over a longer time frame.
16Patents assigned to individuals, most often the academic inventors themselves, are only 3.6%
of French academic patents (see: Lissoni et al. 2008). This is expected, due to the absence of any
legal provision similar to that of the professor’s privilege, as discussed in Section 2. At the same
time though, it may be that several patents formally assigned to business companies are de facto
owned by their inventors, who control the companies and possibly set them up with the precise
intention of using them as vehicles for retaining control of their patents. For these reasons, we have
considered the two types of ownership as one. Note also that introducing a separate category for so
few patents would not have helped the econometric exercise we run in Section 4, the observations
in the category being too few to return significant results.
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Fig. 2 Share of academic
patents over all patents, by
techn. class, 1994–2001/02
Since patents can be co-assigned to multiple assignees, a patent may fall into
more than one of the above-mentioned categories at the same time, whenever
it has more than one assignee, and two or more of such assignees belong to
different categories. We will come back to this problem in Section 4.
Table 4 shows that companies command the highest share of academic
patents, with around 69% of them. The PROs’ share comes second, with over
21% of the patents, leaving universities with no more than 10% of academic
patents (patents co-owned by n >1 types of applicant are counted n times).
Note that this result does not differ much from the findings by Gering and
Schmoch (2003) for Germany, another country where PROs (especially the
Max Planck Institute) play a key role in the national research system.17
It is worth pointing out that the ownership distribution of academic patents
is not uniform across technologies. Universities appear as applicants of about
14% of academic patents in the Pharmaceutical domain and of 10.5% in
Instrumentation, but only of 5% in Chemistry. Companies have a dispropor-
tionately high share of academic patents in Chemistry (78%), Machinery and
Transportation (83%), and Electronics (78%). Patent applications by PROs
are mainly in the field of Pharmaceuticals (30.7%).
Figure 3 provides details on the ownership distribution of academic patents
over time. We note that academic patent applications by Companies decline
from 75.57% in 1994 to 64.50% in 2001, although in absolute values they
increase from 167 in 1994 to 240 in 2000. In contrast, the universities’ share
increases from 10.4% in 1994 to 16.42% in 2001, sharply increasing from 8.41%
in 1998 to 12.22% in 1999.
Research in the literature of technology transfer has shown that university
characteristics matter when dealing with university patenting (Owen-Smith
17Patents by non-respondent professors, which we excluded from the analysis, exhibit a distribu-
tion by type of owner which is more similar to that of non-academic patents than academic ones.
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Table 4 Property distribution of academic patents by DT-7/OST technology domains
Technology classes C Type of applicant %C %PRO %UNI
PRO UNI
Electronics 237 44 23 77.96% 14.47% 7.57%
Instruments 331 86 49 71.03% 18.45% 10.52%
Chemistry 391 85 25 78.04% 16.97% 4.99%
Pharmaceuticals 378 209 93 55.58% 30.74% 13.68%
Process engineering 110 40 25 62.86% 22.86% 14.28%
Machinery - transports 55 4 7 83.33% 6.06% 10.61%
Others 13 1 0 92.86% 7.14% 0.00%
Total 1,515 469 222 68.68% 21.26% 10.06%
Patents co-owned by different typologies of applicants are counted as many times as the typologies
of applicants
and Powell 2001; Feldman and Desrochers 2003). We take this into account in
Table 5, which is based upon the DEP/MENSER classification we introduced
in Section 2.2.1. We note that faculty members of Universities with Medical
School patent chiefly in Pharmaceuticals (40% of their patents), whereas only
around 10% of patents by scientists from other academic institutions are in
the same field. The patenting activity in Scientif ic Universities and Universities
without Medical School is mainly concentrated in Chemistry (about 40%).
Grandes Etablissements appear to be most involved in patenting in Electronics
(45% of their patents). At the same time, we note that Universities with
Medical School are responsible for around 60% of French academic patents
(1,183 out of 1,967).
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4 Analysis
In order to assess whether the introduction of the Innovation Act in 1999
has changed the IPR practices of French universities, we perform several
econometric exercises. In particular, we run both logistic and multinomial
logistic regressions, with the type of applicant for the academic patent (Com-
pany, PRO, or University) as the dependent variable. The key explanatory
variables are two time-related dummies, one which distinguishes between
patents applied for before/after the introduction of the Innovation Act, the
other that marks the absence/presence, in the application year, of a TTO
within the academic inventor’s university. Controls include the technological
classification of the patent and a set of characteristics (such as type and size)
of the inventor’s university, as well as regional dummies to control for local
characteristics of the regions wherein the universities are located.
4.1 The dependent variable
We run two series of regressions, each one with a different specification of
the dependent variable, namely a different classification of patent ownership.
Note that most patents have a single applicant, but many have more than one
(which is often the case when universities are involved in ownership).
In the first series of regressions (logistic), we adopt a binary dependent
variable and distinguish only between university-ownership (UNI=1) and non-
university ownership (UNI=0). All patents having at least one university
among applicants belong to the former category. This means we focus on
universities’ claim of their share of IPRs, without distinguishing between
exclusive ownership and co-ownership, as a result of the introduction of the
Innovation Act and controls.
In a second set of regressions (multinomial logistic), we classify patents
into three ownership categories, which result from a combination of the types
of owners described in Section 3. Each category is assigned a discrete value
(from 1 to 3), as follows:
– Ownership by a PRO, either exclusive or jointly with a Company
(OWNERSHIP=1)
– Exclusive ownership by a company (OWNERSHIP=2)
– University ownership, either exclusive or joint with a PRO or a company
(OWNERSHIP=3)
The main reason for not treating exclusive university ownership as a sep-
arate category, but only together with the case of joint ownership with PROs
and companies, is that very few patents are assigned exclusively to universities.
As explained in Section 2, the most research-intensive among French univer-
sities usually host a number of Unités Mixtes de Recherche (UMRs), which
are research joint ventures with CNRS, INSERM or other large PROs.
Technology transfer from UMRs thus result in a relatively high number of
patents jointly owned by the relevant PRO and the university. A more limited
A. Della Malva et al.
number of patents is jointly owned by a university and a company, too few
for setting them apart, hence the decision to group all of them under the
value OWNERSHIP=3. Similarly, the patents jointly owned by a PRO and
a company are very few, so we decided to group them under the value
OWNERSHIP=1, which leaves all patents with value OWNERSHIP=2 as
those where no public property (via a university or a PRO) is involved.18
4.2 The independent variables
Table 6 reports the relevant descriptive statistics for all regressors.
Time-related regressors the key explanatory variables of interest in the re-
gression are:
– ACT: it takes zero value if the patent was applied for between 1994 and
1998 and value one in the following years (that is, after the introduction of
the Innovation Act).
– YEAR DUMMIES: in a different specification of the model, we substitute
the variable ACT with year dummies, taking 1999 as reference year.
– TTO: it is equal to one if the patent was applied after the university had
introduced an internal regulation regarding IPR and technology transfer
matters, either internally or as external entities, and zero otherwise.19
18In an early version of this work, we employed five categories, the three of this study and
two more including co-ownership between Companies and PROs and co-ownership between
Companies and Universities. However, tests for independence of irrelevant alternatives rejected
the latter.
19The TTO dummy is a university-specific one, which is based upon information on the opening
year of TTOs in French universities taken from the BETA-EcoSc database. If a patent lists only
one academic inventor, or several academic co-inventors from the same university, assigning a
value to TTO is a straightforward exercise (this happens for 89% of the cases, that is, 1552 out
of 1,744 patents). However, patents invented by more than one academic inventor from different
universities may present us with the problem of choosing between different possible values for
the TTO dummy, as long as the relevant universities opened their technology transfer offices in
different years. In these cases, we first set aside university-owned patents, with just one university
as assignee, and set the value of TTO according to information on the latter (2.3% of the cases).
When this criterion could not be applied, we selected the most senior among the academic co-
inventors of the patent, and set the value of TTO according to information on this senior scientist’s
university (5.3% of cases). This choice is based on the assumption that, at the time of the patent,
the more junior co-inventors used to work with the most senior one at the latter’s university, either
as PhD, PostDoc or young Assistant Professors, and moved on to their present institute later on.
If this assumption proves untenable (the junior co-inventor’s move to her present institute pre-
dates the patent application), we assume that decisions on ownership attribution of the patent had
been taken by the academic inventor from the university with the most expertise in handling IPR
matters (the latter being measured by the total number of all patents produced by the university).
This choice, which is highly subjective, applies only to 3.3% of the patents.
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Table 6 Independent variables, descriptive statistics (all observations and by type of patent
assignee)
Total PROS Companies Universities
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Time-related regressors
ACT 0.44 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.58 (0.50)
1994 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.27) 0.12 (0.32) 0.10 (0.30)
1995 0.09 (0.28) 0.06 (0.24) 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.25)
1996 0.12 (0.32) 0.10 (0.30) 0.13 (0.34) 0.07 (0.26)
1997 0.12 (0.32) 0.15 (0.36) 0.11 (0.32) 0.07 (0.26)
1998 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.32)
1999 0.16 (0.37) 0.20 (0.40) 0.14 (0.34) 0.21 (0.41)
2000 0.17 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36) 0.19 (0.39)
2001 onwards 0.11 (0.32) 0.08 (0.27) 0.11 (0.31) 0.19 (0.39)
TTO 0.64 (0.48) 0.61 (0.49) 0.63 (0.48) 0.77 (0.42)
University characteristics
Schools of eng. 0.15 (0.36) 0.12 (0.33) 0.17 (0.37) 0.14 (0.35)
Univ. w/ medical schools 0.60 (0.49) 0.70 (0.46) 0.55 (0.50) 0.67 (0.47)
Univ. w/out medical schools 0.09 (0.28) 0.06 (0.23) 0.10 (0.30) 0.06 (0.25)
Scientific univ. 0.16 (0.37) 0.12 (0.33) 0.19 (0.39) 0.12 (0.33)
Largest 0.25 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44) 0.22 (0.42) 0.35 (0.48)
Large 0.29 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.29 (0.45) 0.30 (0.46)
Medium 0.37 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.25 (0.43)
Small 0.09 (0.29) 0.07 (0.25) 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.30)
Patent tech. field
Instruments 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40)
Pharma - biotech 0.29 (0.45) 0.42 (0.49) 0.21 (0.41) 0.44 (0.50)
Chemicals 0.14 (0.35) 0.10 (0.30) 0.17 (0.38) 0.10 (0.30)
Electronic 0.25 (0.43) 0.20 (0.40) 0.29 (0.45) 0.12 (0.32)
Machinery - process tech 0.12 (0.33) 0.10 (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) 0.15 (0.36)
# Observations 1,744 383 1,157 204
We expect ACT and TTO to bear a positive influence on the probability
for UNI to take value 1 in the logistic regressions and for OWNERSHIP to
take value 3 in the second series of (multinomial logistic) regressions. Similarly,
when substituting year dummies to ACT, we expect dummies for years before
1999 to bear a negative and significant sign in both series of regressions.
Institutional dif ferences We control for the academic inventors’ affiliation to
one or other type of academic institutions by turning such classification into
a set of dummies, which are based upon the DEP/MENESR classification,
according to the affiliation of the patent’s inventor: School of Engineering
(to which we add the Instituts Nationaux Polytechniques and the Grands
Etablissements, the technology transfer activity of which occurs mainly in
Engineering), Universities with Medical School, Universities without Medical
School, and Scientif ic Universities. If more than one academic co-inventor is
listed on the same patent, and they come from institutes of different type, then
the dummy takes value 1 according to the assigning procedure described in
Footnote 19. The reference category is Universities with Medical School.
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Size We control for university size by classifying the various institutions as
largest, large, medium and small, according to quartile distribution of the
number of medical, science and engineering faculties in 2005.20 We thus
employ dummies for each size category. The reference category is largest and
we expect such universities to be more likely than others to apply for patents in
their own name, being better staffed when it comes to administrative issues. In
addition, we expect such universities to have greater bargaining power vis a vis
large PROs such as CNRS, when it comes to negotiations over IPR attribution.
Patent’s technological f ield This set of controls consists of dummies for
the technology class of the patents, which we derived by elaborating a re-
classification of IPC (International Patent Classification, used by the EPO)
provided by the Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques (OST 2004). In
particular, we use the following five dummies: Pharma-Biotech, Instruments,
Chemicals, Electronics and Machinery and Process Technologies, the latter
being the reference category.21
Regional dummies Finally, we control for potential differences in the regional
environment of the various universities by means of a set of 21 dummies, one
for each mainland region of France.
5 Results and discussion
5.1 The binary model of patent assignment
Table 7 reports the results of our logistic regression exercise on the probability
of an academic patent being assigned to the inventor’s university, either exclu-
sively or jointly with another type of assignee (either a PRO or a company); for
the sake of simplicity, we will often refer to this as a university’s “probability
of patenting”. We report estimates of marginal effects of explanatory variables
calculated as means for continuous variables and changes from 0 to 1 for
dichotomous variables.
We employ four specifications. In column (A), we consider only the effect of
the Innovation Act (ACT), while in column (C) we also test for the opening of
a Technology Transfer Office in the inventor’s university (TTO). In columns
(B) and (D), we conduct similar exercises, but we substitute variable ACT with
20Note that information on faculty size relates only to 2005, the only year for which we have
information on universities. In principle, professors’ mobility may have been such that relative
size in the past differed from that of 2005. However, the largest universities of the 1990s, such as
Paris VI, Lyon I, Toulouse III, Grenoble I or Strasbourg I, were and still are the largest at the time
we wrote the paper. Also, we found no mention in the literature of significant structural changes
across French universities in the years of our interest.
21The original OST (2004) classification contains seven classes, which we reduced to five by
aggregating the last 3, in which the presence of academic patents is scant.
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year dummies, with 1999, the year when the Act was passed, as the reference
case. We expect dummies for years>1999 to be positive, and/or dummies for
years<1999 to be negative.
Estimates in column (A) suggest a positive and significant effect of the In-
novation Act on the probability that universities will apply for their inventors’
patents; in particular, we estimate an increase of probability of around 5.7%.
The controls for university typology do not capture any variation in patent
assignment.22 However, the size of universities seems to matter, as we observe
that small and medium universities’ probability of patenting is, respectively,
5.3% and 6.8% lower than that of the largest universities (the reference case).
Finally, universities are less likely to apply for patents in Electronics and
Chemicals than in Pharma-Biotech, Scientific Instruments, and Machinery-
Process Technology.
We interpret differences between Electronics and Chemicals on the one
hand, and Pharma-Biotech and Scientific Instruments, on the other hand, as
resulting from differences in the inventive process and funding, and in the
relationship between patented invention and commercial product.23
When substituting ACT with year dummies (column B), universities are
found to have been less likely to apply for patents before 1999: the dummies as-
sociated with the years between 1995 and 1998 are all negative and significant,
while the year dummies after 1999 are not significant. Universities’ probability
of patenting before 1999 is estimated to be between 4% and 5.2% lower than in
1999 and afterwards. As for the other controls, their coefficients do not change
much with respect to column (A).
Moving to column (C), we notice that the inclusion of TTO captures all the
variation attributed to university size in columns (A) and (B); this is because, as
expected, the larger universities were the first to open a technology office. The
presence of a TTO increases a university’s patenting probability to 5.6%. Note
that controlling for TTO diminishes, but does not cancel or cut drastically, the
impact of the Innovation Act (the marginal effect of ACT is only 1% lower in
column C than in column A). Results for the technology classes of the patents
do not change much.
The last specification (column D) confirms the results of the previous
specifications: the opening of a TTO mitigates the effects of the Act and
22This result is not overly surprising as controls for technological fields are the strongest explana-
tory factor among our controls (see results for specification 2). At the same time, we noted earlier
(Table 5) that university types differ for the technological fields in which their inventors sign
patents.
23Patents in Electronics and Chemicals are more likely to originate from consultancy and contract
research than happens in other fields, with commercial sponsors claiming all IPRs. In addition,
patented inventions may cover only a small section of larger, more complex product and process
technologies than in Pharmaceuticals or Instruments, where a patent document may point more
clearly to a marketable drug or scientific or measurement tool; the longer the distance between
patent and product, the less interest the university may have in retaining the patent and trying to
license it, as opposed to selling it straight away for a lump sum payment.
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captures the variation due to university characteristics, while it does not affect
other covariates’ marginal effects.
The significance of ACT, along with the positive and significant impact of
TTO, confirms the importance of institutional changes, both at the micro and
macro levels, in increasing university administrations’ IPRs awareness. Note
that these results do not change when we employ year dummies to control for
the temporal consistency of the positive result found for ACT. We also find
that the opening of a technology transfer office has the strongest impact among
university characteristics on the decision to retain ownership over academic
inventions.
5.2 The multinomial model of patent assignment
Table 8 presents the results (estimated marginal effects) for multinomial
logistic regressions. The three-value OWNERSHIP dependent variable allows
us to assess whether the increase of patent ownership by universities (as
described by the logistic regressions of Section 5.1) has occurred at the expense
of ownership by PROs and/or companies. We run two different specifications,
which we indicate as (1) and (2). In both specifications, we assess the effect
of the Innovation Act jointly with that of a university’s opening of a TTO.
In specification (1), we do so by means of the ACT dummy, whereas in
specification (2), we make use of the year dummies, as described above. The
results for each specification are reported in three separate columns, as we
calculate and report the marginal effects of the independent variables for
all three types of ownership considered, respectively PROs, Companies, and
Universities.
The main results we obtain can be summarized as follows:
– The Innovation Act did not significantly diminish the probability for an
academic patent to be owned by a PRO, and possibly increased it for a
short while, other things being equal. While the marginal effect for ACT
[specification (1), first column] is positive but not significant, the year
dummies for year<1999 are all negative [specification (2), second column].
This suggests that, in the 1990s, before the Act was introduced, PROs had
a lower probability for reclaiming ownership or co-ownership of academic
patents away from universities. Remember that OWNERSHIP=1 in the
case the academic patent is owned by a public organization, possibly
jointly with a company, but not jointly with a university, in which case we
have OWNERSHIP=3. The year dummy for 2001, however, also bears a
negative and significant sign, which may suggest that the effect of the Act,
besides being weak, may not have lasted long. It is also possible that the
Act did not affect negotiations over IPR assignment between PROs and
universities, whereas the more general reform of the relationships between
the two (as described in Section 2.2) did, albeit not consistently over time.
This interpretation is coherent with the descriptive findings by Lissoni et al.
(2008), who find that PROs’ share of academic patents declined sharply
A. Della Malva et al.
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through the 1980s and early 1990s (that is, before the Innovation Act) and
bounced back, albeit limitedly, later on.
– Exclusive property of academic patents by companies (OWNERSHIP=2)
appears to have been negatively affected by the Innovation Act, which
diminished its probability by 7.3% [marginal effect of ACT, specification
(1), third column]. This seems confirmed by specification (2) (fourth
column), where marginal effects of year dummies show that the probability
of having an academic patent in the exclusive hands of private parties
was between 12% and 14.5% higher in 1994–1996 than in 1998 and the
following years; in the latter, we observe some weak increases in 1998 and
2001.
– As for universities, the interpretation of the results is even more straight-
forward. As in the binary model (Section 5.1), the probability of ex-
clusive or joint ownership by universities increases after the Innovation
Act, whether we consider specification (1) (fifth column) or specification
(2) (sixth column). In the latter, we observe that universities’ probability
of patenting is significantly lower between 1995 and 1998 than in 1999, and
does not increase or decrease significantly later on.
Overall, these results suggest that the Act, and/or more generally, the polit-
ical climate around universities and their mission, including IPR management,
have made universities more aggressive in reclaiming their share of IPRs
over academic patents from companies, but have not changed their attitude
much towards PROs. Possibly, the latter have also increased their pressure
on companies to share the IPRs over the inventions produced by academics
(most likely, with the participation of PROs’ personnel and/or in university-
based, PRO-staffed laboratories). It is important to stress, however, that the
number of patents exclusively assigned to universities is still limited. In order to
increase their control over academic patents, universities have mainly obtained
to share the property of such patents, especially with companies, which, as a
result, are now less likely to be the exclusive assignees.24
When examining the effect of TTO, we find that the estimated effect for
the TTO dummy is significant (and positive) for the probability of university
ownership (last two columns of Table 8), but it is not significant (albeit
negative, as expected) for the probability of PRO and company ownership
(first four columns of Table 8). We explain the result as follows: the impact of
TTOs on university ownership is significant per se, but it comes at the expense
both of ownership by PROs and of ownership by companies; taken separately,
these two negative effects are too small to be statistically significant (that is,
when splitting the TTO effect on university ownership into two parts, neither
24Given the limited number of academic patents co-applied for by universities and companies
(34 out of 1,744 patent applications in the whole sample), we were unable to test such a statement
empirically. However, in the university-company academic patent subsample, only 13 (38.2%)
were applied for between 1994 and 1998, whereas 56% of all academic patents were applied for
during the same years.
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part is significant, although exclusive ownership by companies seems to decline
the most).
The regression results in Table 8 also provide interesting information on
the relationship between PROs, companies, and universities of different type
and size. From the first and second columns, we note that the probability
for an academic patent to be assigned to a PRO, and not to the inventor’s
university or a company, is around 8% lower for Universities without Medical
Schools (compared to those with one), and around 11% lower for Scientif ic
Universities (while Schools of Engineering do not differ much from Universities
with Medical Schools). This is possibly because Universities with Medical
Schools and Schools of Engineering host a comparatively larger number of
UMRs, so that CNRS and other large PROs have more bargaining power when
it comes to IPR matters. At the same time, we note that academic patents from
large universities are more likely to be retained by PROs than those from the
largest ones (reference case) and small and medium ones. Companies appear
to be more likely to obtain exclusive ownership of academic patents when the
latter come from Scientif ic Universities (the marginal effect is around 14.8% in
the third column, very much the same in the fourth), which is the category of
universities most engaged in contract research (see Bach and Llerena 2010).
As with the logistic regression, university type does not affect the probability
of university ownership.
The estimated marginal effects for technology dummies confirm the results
and interpretation we provided in Section 5.1. Academic patents in Electronics
and Chemicals are less likely to be reclaimed by universities (negative and
significant marginal effects in fifth and sixth columns), and, at the same time,
more likely to be assigned exclusively to companies (positive and significant
marginal effects in third and fourth columns). PROs are also (weakly) less
likely to reclaim property away from universities in these fields (first and
second columns).
When it comes to Pharma-Biotech patents, however, PROs are more likely
to reclaim property (exclusive or joint with companies), and companies less
likely to obtain exclusive property. Note that the multinomial logistic exercise
does not reproduce exactly the result we got from the logistic one, since we now
find the probability of universities to retain or share the property of patents
in this field is positive, but not significant. We also do not find significant
differences in ownership patterns for patents over Instruments.25
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have dealt with French academic researchers’ contribution to
inventive activity between 1994 and 2002, as measured by patent applications
25We performed the Hausman and McFadden (1984) and the Small and Hsiao (1985) tests to
test for the Irrelevance of independent alternatives (IIA) assumption. Both tests support the IIA
assumption.
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at the EPO. In particular, we have assessed the impact of a major institutional
change (the Innovation Act of 1999) over the ownership distribution of
academic inventions. In addition, we have explored the concurrent effects of
an important organizational change such as the diffusion of technology transfer
offices, over the same years.
As for the distribution of academic patent ownership, we have confirmed
what was found by other studies, such as Azagra-Caro et al. (2006) for the
specific case of the University of Strasbourg, and Lissoni et al. (2008) for
several European countries, namely, that universities own (or, more often, co-
own) only a minor share of their scientists’ patented inventions (around 11%
over the whole period we considered). When we consider ownership or co-
ownership by PROs, the share of academic patents in public hands over the
period examined rises to around 33%, still much less than those controlled
exclusively by business companies. This ownership distribution is due to
institutional factors, and not to any peculiarity in the technological distribution
of French academic patents; the latter, in fact, does not differ much from what
was found by Mowery et al. (2001) for the USA, in an altogether different
institutional setting.
The econometric exercise has shown that changes in the institutional and
organizational settings, however, may have some noticeable impact, even in
a complex academic system such as the French one. However, understanding
these effects requires taking into account such complexity, which in France has
mainly to do with the relationship between universities and PROs, and with
the stratification of universities themselves, by type and size.
We have shown that the Innovation Act, which indicates technology transfer
via commercialization as a mission for French universities and provides both
incentives and recommendation to this end, has increased the probability that
universities will reclaim (their share of) property rights over their scientists’
inventions. The Act and its effects, however, fit into a more general trend of
universities’ involvement in IPR management of their scientists’ inventions.
In particular, we found that many universities’ decision to open a technology
transfer office pre-dates the Act and has exerted an even bigger effect than
the latter. These results are in line with what Baldini et al. (2006) found for
Italy, where universities increased the total number of patents applied for in
their names after the adoption of internal IPR regulations, as required by a
change in national legislation (such an adoption was contextual to the creation
of a TTO).
Whether this more aggressive stance of French universities has been (or will
be) beneficial in terms of technology transfer and societal welfare remains to
be seen, our data being too limited in time and scope to provide information
on this issue. Our findings suggest that any increase in universities’ patenting
rate may be due, at least in part, to a redistribution of ownership rights, rather
than an increase in inventive activity. This interpretation is in line with the
descriptive evidence provided in Section 3. Although the number of academic
patents has increased over time, the rate of growth has not exceeded the overall
national growth rate, so the academic’s share of total patents has not increased
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in a steady way. In order to check the robustness of this interpretation, we
plan to repeat our assessment of academic patenting activity in the near future,
based upon archival information on scientists active in more recent years, so
to have a more reliable time series.
It may also be that by reclaiming their share of IPRs from companies,
French universities will achieve little in terms of financial returns, or strategic
control of the knowledge their inventors produce, at the cost of creating
tensions with their industrial partners (and possibly their own faculty). Again,
this is an important direction for future research.
One limitation of our exercise concerns the possibility of endogeneity in our
estimates. In particular, it may be that the Innovation Act was anticipated by
French universities, so that the effects of ownership redistribution we observe
took place as a result of a strategic change, rather than as the mere results of
the implementation of a legislative change. Similarly, it may be that the Act
was meant more as a way of extending to some “conservative” universities
the technology transfer practices already in place in more “entrepreneurial”
ones. At most, however, these limitations may challenge the exact value of
the marginal effects we estimated in our logistic and multinomial logistic
regressions. They cannot detract from the general findings, which point to a
change in the French policy climate during the 1990s, and to the resulting
efforts of universities to control more tightly the IPRs over their faculty’s
inventions.
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